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A Constellation of Benefits and a Universe of
Equal Protection: The Extension of the Right
to Marry Under Pavan v. Smith
In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the constitutional right of all
persons, including same-sex couples, to lawfully marry. 1 In 2017,
in Pavan v. Smith, the Court recognized that Obergefell extends
that right to much more than the act of marriage in itself. 2 Any
person who would have been denied the right to marry the person
of her choice before Obergefell now enjoys not only the rights of
marriage licensing and recognition, but also the full
“constellation” of rights and responsibilities that attend marriage
among traditional opposite-sex couples.3 The Court believed that
this interpretation was so plainly visible on Obergefell’s face that
it rendered its decision in Pavan summarily, without oral
argument.4
Before Pavan, Arkansas’s birth certificate regime would
have denied legally recognized motherhood to the woman
married to a biological mother at the time of birth by denying a
place for her name on the birth certificate. 5 In its unsigned, per
curiam opinion, the Supreme Court struck down the genderspecific statutory language that made this outcome acceptable. 6
Dissenting Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justices Alito and
Thomas, did not believe that such an outcome was so clear from


J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2019. The author is indebted to
Prof. Jordan Woods, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, for
his invaluable advice and encouragement in the drafting process. The author would also like
to thank Luke Brasuell for his assistance as Note and Comment Editor—as well as fellow
editors, family, and friends—for their continual support.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
2. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (per curiam) (citing Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. at 2605).
3. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
4. Id. at 2076-77.
5. Id. at 2077 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e), (f)(1) (2014)). See generally
infra Appendix (copy of statutory text).
6. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
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the text of Obergefell and would have constrained the right to
marry to the rights to licensing and recognition of marriage. 7
But what should be most troubling for advocates of samesex couples is not that Justice Gorsuch has a narrow, conservative
vision of the right to marry. Instead, advocates should more
carefully note the exception to the broader right of marriage that
he implies for purportedly “biology based“ family law regimes. 8
Under Nguyen v. INS, which Justice Gorsuch and the Arkansas
Supreme Court majority cite with approval, 9 gender
discrimination may surmount heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause if it is based on the biological differences
between the sexes rather than impermissible stereotypes. 10 Yet
Nguyen was met with a forceful dissent and abundant criticism
from commentators for its weak application of heightened
scrutiny and its use of impermissible gender stereotypes glossed
as rational assumptions. 11 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, decided
two weeks before Pavan, more strongly applies heightened
scrutiny to gender discrimination and takes a stronger stance
against “overbroad generalizations” of gender than Nguyen.12
This Note on Pavan v. Smith will argue not only that Justice
Gorsuch erroneously interprets Obergefell, other caselaw, and the
relevant statutes, but also that his preference for Nguyen over
Morales-Santana signals the dangerous potential for a future
Court and many lower courts to disrupt the lives of same-sex
parents. To meet that threat, advocates should use Obergefell,
Pavan, and Morales-Santana in analytical concert. This Note
provides a starting point for such analysis.
Part I of this Note tracks the procedural history of this case
from the trial court to the U.S. Supreme Court. 13 Part II sets up
the argument by synthesizing two relevant lines of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent on: (1) the importance of the benefits of marriage
7. Id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001)); Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437,
at 17-18, 505 S.W.3d 169, 181 (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73), rev’d per curiam 137 S. Ct.
2075 (2017).
10. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68, 73 (2001).
11. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see sources cited infra note 323.
12. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017).
13. See infra Part I.
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to a definition of marriage;14 and, (2) the use of biological
distinctions
in
equal-protection
sex
discrimination
jurisprudence. 15
Part III makes two arguments agreeing with the majority’s
analysis and countering the dissent of Justice Gorsuch. 16 First,
the opinion of the Arkansas Supreme Court majority is “clearly
in error” because the Court’s interpretation of Obergefell is
correct and the Arkansas birth certificate statutes do not create a
purely biology-based birth records regime. 17 The Court’s opinion
is supported by three types of precedent: (1) cases incorporating
the legal benefits of marriage within the right to marry; (2) earlier
cases implying the right of a married couple to a birth certificate;
and, (3) Obergefell, which plainly requires states to grant samesex marriage on the same “terms and conditions” as opposite-sex
marriage.18 Second, the application of Nguyen v. INS to defend
statutes conferring marriage benefits unequally between
opposite-sex and same-sex couples is limited by both the
heightened scrutiny standard articulated in Morales-Santana and
the expanded definition of the fundamental right to marry
clarified in Pavan.19 Although other commentators have already
explored the flaws of Nguyen and shown how Morales-Santana
limits it,20 this Part demonstrates how the broad reach of Pavan
can be and has been used together with Obergefell and MoralesSantana to protect the rights of married same-sex couples,
individual parents in same-sex divorces, and possibly even
transgender persons who are not in same-sex marriages.21

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See sources cited infra note 323.
See infra Section III.B.
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I. CASE SUMMARY
A. FACTS AND CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING
Three married female couples, the Pavans, the Jacobses, and
Courtney Kassell and Kelly Scott (“the couples”), filed suit to
seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the Arkansas
Department of Health (“ADH”). 22 The suit stemmed from the
refusal of ADH to issue birth certificates for their respective
children that included the names of both spouses, which they
argued “violated their constitutional rights to equal protection and
due process.”23 The Jacobses and Pavans married in 2010 and
2011.24 Terrah Pavan and Leigh Jacobs gave birth to their
children in Arkansas in May and June 2015. 25 Both conceived
through assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) involving an
anonymous donor.26 In both cases, ADH would not place the
names of Marisa Pavan and Jana Jacobs on the birth certificate. 27
Courtney Kassell and Kelly Scott resided in Arkansas when
Courtney gave birth in January 2015. 28 As with the Pavans and
Jacobses, Courtney and Kelly conceived through ART involving
an anonymous donor. 29 The couple married in July 2015.30 The
couple made multiple requests that ADH place Kelly’s name on
22. Complaint at 10-12, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1,
2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153).
23. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 3, 505 S.W.3d 169, 173, rev’d per curiam 137
S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
24. Id. at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
25. Id. at 2, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
26. Id. at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d at 172. Note that all courts involved use the term “artificial
insemination” to describe the means by which the child is conceived. Apart from mentions
of the “artificial insemination” statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2015), where the term
is explicitly used, this author believes it is more appropriate to give the label of “assisted
reproductive technology” to any means of conception other than insemination by intercourse.
This term is meant to encompass not only intrauterine or intracervical insemination of donor
sperm but also in vitro fertilization, which is performed outside the body. However, federal
law, and therefore the CDC, defines ART more narrowly to include only treatments
involving “the handling of human oocytes or embryos,” not sperm alone. 42 U.S.C. § 263a7(1) (2012); see also CDC, What is Assisted Reproductive Technology? (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/art/whatis.html [https://perma.cc/2ZCW-7PLL].
27. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2-3, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
28. Id. at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 172-73.
29. Id. at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 173.
30. Id.
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the birth certificate, both before and after the marriage, and ADH
denied them the alteration each time. 31
The couples sought three avenues of relief: (1) to have
certain statutory provisions governing the issuance of birth
certificates, including Arkansas Code Annotated sections 20-18401(e), (f) and 20-18-406(a)(2), “declared unconstitutional as
written;”32 (2) to enjoin the Director of ADH, Nathaniel Smith,
from “refusing to list the names of both spouses of a same-sex
couple on the birth certificate of [a] minor child;” 33 and (3) to
require Smith, by court order, “to issue corrected birth certificates
naming both spouses.”34
There were two statutory provisions against which the
couples sought declaratory relief: Arkansas Code Annotated
sections 20-18-401(e), (f) and -406(a)(2).35 The portions of
section 20-18-401 governed entry of the names of the parents on
a child’s birth certificate, 36 while section 20-18-406(a)(2)
addressed the issuance of a new birth certificate to a “person” who
has been “legitimated.” 37 Petitioners’ constitutional complaints
arose from section 20-18-401’s gender-specific references to the
“father” of the child and the “husband” of the mother and the
State’s exclusionary interpretation of the term “legitimated” as
used in section 20-18-406(a)(2).38
31. Id.
32. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 173. This Note cites to the 2014
replacement volume of the Arkansas Code Annotated when referring to sections 20-18-401
and 20-18-406. When referring to section 9-10-201, this Note cites to the 2015 replacement
volume. This is because both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court refer
to these replacement volumes. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per
curiam); Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2, 4, 505 S.W.3d at 172-73. Since the Supreme Court
handed down Pavan, the Arkansas legislature has not amended any of these statutes in
compliance with Pavan, and the text remains substantially the same as of 2018. See ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-201, 20-18-401(e), (f); 20-18-406(a)(2) (2018).
33. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 3, 505 S.W.3d at 173.
34. Id.
35. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment with Incorporated Brief at 14-16, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL
12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153) [hereinafter “Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment”]; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e), (f) (2014), invalidated by
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2)
(2014). See generally infra Appendix (copy of statutory text).
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(e), (f).
37. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2).
38. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 12, 15-16.
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In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the State claimed that
Petitioners’ constitutional challenges should have failed because
“parental rights, and parental designations on birth certificates, do
not arise from marital relationships.” 39 Though the common-law
doctrine of in loco parentis and the statutory construct of adoption
both exist as modes of finding a relationship between a parent and
a child not biologically related, each doctrine “does not turn on
any marital relationship between the intended parent and a
biological parent of a child.” 40 There would be no due process
violation, so the State claimed, because non-biological parents
and children do not have the constitutional right to a parental
relationship with each other. 41 The State also claimed that there
was no equal protection violation because the statutes classified
based on the biological parentage of the couples, not their gender
or sexual orientation. 42
In the couples’ own motion for summary judgment and
response, they made four arguments that were ultimately relevant:
(1) that in 2014, the State had already been enjoined by Judge
Chris Piazza of the Pulaski County Circuit Court in Wright v.
State from enforcing any law which denied same-sex married
couples “the rights, recognition and benefits associated with
marriage in the State of Arkansas;” 43 (2) that the State was not in
compliance with Obergefell v. Hodges because the decision
mandated the extension of both civil marriage and its benefits to
same-sex couples, specifically including “birth and death
certificates;”44 (3) that Petitioners could not wait for “the
democratic process” to amend the offending statutes in lieu of a
court order;45 and (4) that Petitioners’ rights under the Due
39. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment ¶9, at 4, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL
12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153).
40. Id.
41. Id. ¶9, at 5.
42. Id. ¶10, at 5. On a minor note, the State made no citation to Obergefell v. Hodges
in its Motion for Summary Judgment Motion and brief, despite an admission in its Answer
to the Complaint that Obergefell “speaks for itself.” Answer ¶4, at 2, Pavan v. Smith, 2015
WL 12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153).
43. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 6-8 (quoting Wright
v. State, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1998002, at *2 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2014), appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 298 (per curiam)).
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. Id. at 10-11.
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Process and Equal Protection Clauses were violated. 46 The due
process claim linked the naming of both spouses on the birth
certificate to both the fundamental right to marry and the right for
a parent to raise a child as she sees fit.47 For their equal protection
claim, Petitioners argued as members of two classes—sexual
orientation and gender—that heightened scrutiny should apply
and that the statutes survive neither intermediate scrutiny nor
even the “basic standards” of rational-basis review.48
In its reply,49 the State first interpreted the Wright injunction
narrowly in light of Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e),
which mandated that injunction orders “shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained or mandated.” 50
Because the Wright court never mentioned birth certificates or
gave any related instruction to ADH, Rule 65(e) foreclosed the
argument “that ADH ha[d] already been enjoined to amend birth
certificates.”51 Next, the State similarly limited Obergefell to its
basic holding protecting same-sex marriage in itself and pointed
to the absence of specific language in Obergefell “requiring states
to amend birth certificates as requested in this case.”52 Finally,
the State rebutted Petitioners’ direct equal protection and due
process arguments and so asked the court to subject its actions to
rational basis review and hold its actions justified by “numerous
rational, and even compelling, governmental interests.”53
46. Id. at 16-26.
47. Id. at 25-26.
48. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 17-25.
49. Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 12990015 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1,
2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153) [hereinafter “Defendant’s Reply”].
50. Id. at 4 (quoting ARK. R. CIV. P. 65(e) (2017) (omitted 2018)) (emphases omitted).
Although the Defendant’s Reply and the Circuit Court both cite to Rule 65(e), the Arkansas
Supreme Court opinions instead cite to Rule 65(d)(1)(C), which contains the same
instruction in substance: “Every order granting an injunction . . . must . . . describe in
reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts
restrained or required.” ARK. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(C). In 2018, Rule 65(e) was omitted from
the Rules of Civil Procedure for stylistic purposes. ARK. R. CIV. P. 65 reporter’s note 6.
51. Defendant’s Reply, supra note 49, at 4.
52. Id. at 4-5.
53. Id. at 5-9. The interests cited by the State included: “ensuring the accuracy of vital
records; allowing the ADH to compile, maintain, and analyze accurate vital statistics for
purposes of public health research and identification of public health trends; and allowing
individual identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions.” Id. at 8-9.
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The Circuit Court of Pulaski County, under Judge Davis
Fox, issued a memorandum opinion denying the State’s Motion
for Summary Judgment with respect to the couples in their
individual capacities and granting in part and denying in part the
couples’ Motion for Summary Judgment in their individual
capacities.54 First, the court found that the Wright injunction was
binding on the State as res judicata because it had missed two
opportunities in its appeal of Wright to raise the issue of the
injunction’s compliance with Rule 65(e) and could not
collaterally attack the judgment in the instant proceeding. 55 Next,
the court issued its own judgment declaring the majority of
section 20-18-401(e), (f) unconstitutional and ordering an
interpretation of section 20-18-406(a)(2) that would be inclusive
of same-sex couples.56 In its explanation of the legal effect of the
judgment, the court passed on a guarantee of broad constitutional
rights for same-sex persons and instead defined the “sum total” of
the decision’s legal effect as a guarantee to the Petitioners of “the
same constitutional rights with respect to the issuance of birth
certificates and amended birth certificates as opposite-sex
couples.”57 The court specifically found that section 20-18401(e), (f) “intertwined the concepts of ‘parent’ with certain
rights and presumptions occurring within a marital relationship,
using now impermissible limiting spousal terms of ‘husband’ and
‘wife.’”58 To Judge Fox, this language “categorically prohibits”
same-sex married couples from enjoying spousal benefits equal
to those available to opposite-sex couples.59 Although the State
foreclosed an as-applied challenge by issuing birth certificates

54. Pavan v. Smith, No. 60CV-15-3153, 2015 WL 12990015, at *1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec.
1, 2015). The court granted and denied the State’s and couples’ motions for summary
judgment, respectively, “with respect to the claims of the plaintiffs as parents, next friends,
and guardians of their respective minor children.” Id. at *2. The court dismissed with
prejudice all causes of action pursued in such “representative capacities.” Id.
55. Id. at *4-5.
56. Id. at *5-8.
57. Id. at *11.
58. Id. at *6.
59. Pavan, 2015 WL 12990015, at *6.
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naming both spouses of each couple, 60 it appealed on the other
merits.61
B. ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT HOLDING
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the
Circuit Court’s judgment. 62 The justices were divided 6-1 on
some issues and 5-2 on others, but Justice Hart could only gain a
majority of four votes for her opinion. 63 On the constitutional
merits issues, Justice Hart’s majority limited Obergefell to its
basic holding recognizing the right to marriage recognition, and
then ruled against the couples on their due process and equal
protection claims. 64 The other three justices were divided
between the two very different partial concurrences of Chief
Justice Brill and Justice Wood, as well as the full dissent of Justice
Danielson.65
1. Hart’s Majority
First, as to the issue of the Wright orders, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the State was not required to follow the
Wright injunction due to Wright’s lack of specific instructions
concerning birth certificates. 66 The majority reasoned that it does
not matter that the State could have raised the issues at certain
points in the Wright appeal because the language of the Wright
orders “would not have placed Smith on notice” of a need to raise
arguments “related to “the overbreadth of the injunctive relief
granted and to the issuance of birth certificates.” 67 As for the
Circuit Court’s reliance on Obergefell to strike or reinterpret the
statutes at issue, the state high court majority rejected its analysis,
60. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 14, 505 S.W.3d 169, 179.
61. See Amended Notice of Appeal ¶2, at 2, Pavan v. Smith, 2015 WL 12990015 (Ark.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2015) (No. 60CV-15-3153).
62. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 2, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
63. Id. at 1, 505 S.W.3d at 169.
64. Id. at 9-13, 19, 505 S.W.3d at 176-78, 181-82.
65. Id. at 21-28, 505 S.W.3d at 183-86 (Brill, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 28-33, 505 S.W.3d at 186-89 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 33-37, 505 S.W.3d at 189-91 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 7, 505 S.W.3d at 175 (majority opinion).
67. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 7, 505 S.W.3d at 175.
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favoring the State’s narrow interpretation of Obergefell which
limited the decision to its fundamental holding. 68
The court then concluded that despite language in Obergefell
warning against a “slower case-by-case determination of the
required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex
couples,”69 the statutes at issue “pass constitutional muster.” 70
Using plain-meaning construction and a presumption of
constitutionality, the court concluded that each of the statutes at
issue center “on the relationship of the biological mother and the
biological father to the child, not on the marital relationship,”
even though section 20-18-401(e), (f) uses terms such as
“husband” and “wife.”71
Not only did the majority find no language in Obergefell
which answered the questions presented in the case, but it could
find no other support for a facial challenge to the statutory
language on due process and equal protection grounds. 72 The
court stated that only one distinct issue was subject to its due
process analysis: “whether the birth-certificate statutes as written
deny the [couples] due process.” 73 The scope of the question is
narrow because the purpose of the statutes, “to truthfully record
the nexus of the biological mother and the biological father to the
child,” concerned neither the right to same-sex marriage nor the
right to be a parent to the child of one’s same-sex spouse.74 As
such, the fundamental rights to marry and make decisions as a
parent were irrelevant, and the naming of the nonbiological
spouse on a birth certificate was not a fundamental “interest of the
person.”75
In response to the equal protection claim, the court first
answered the contention of disparate treatment resulting from the
statutes’ permission of male spouses to be listed as fathers, “even
though the male spouse may not be the child’s biological
68.
69.
(2015)).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 9-10, 505 S.W.3d at 176-77.
Id. at 10, 505 S.W.3d at 177 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606
Id.
Id. at 10-12, 505 S.W.3d at 177-78.
Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 12-19, 505 S.W.3d at 178-82.
Id. at 16, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
Id. at 16-17, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
Id. at 17, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
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father.”76 The court countered with the observation that a
husband’s designation as the father may be refuted under section
20-18-401(f), “which evidences that the biological connection is
what the birth certificate intends to record,” rather than a
statement on the marriage of the parents. 77 Citing United States
Supreme Court precedent, the court stated, “[i]t does not violate
equal protection to acknowledge basic biological truths.”78 The
court acquiesced to the couples’ request for heightened scrutiny, 79
but then applied it in the State’s favor: the statutes serve the
“important governmental objective [of] tracing public-health
trends and providing critical assistance to an individual’s
identification of personal health issues and genetic conditions,”
and the requirement on a birth certificate of biological relation of
a mother and father to the child was “substantially related to the
achievement” of that objective. 80
In its final comment on the merits of the case, the court
addressed an alternative form of relief for the couples raised by
the State in its brief and during oral argument: that the court
amend Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-201(a).81 The
State conceded that this statute, permitting a child conceived by
“artificial insemination” to be “deemed the legitimate natural
child” of its married mother and the mother’s “husband,” was
unconstitutional.82 But because the court “is not a legislative
body” and because the Circuit Court never ruled on that statute’s
constitutionality, the court declined to address the issue.83

76. Id.
77. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437 at 17, 505 S.W.3d at 180.
78. Id. at 17-18, 505 S.W.3d at 181; see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (“The
difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the
principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at hand in a
manner specific to each gender.”).
79. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 18, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 18-19, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
82. Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2015)). See generally infra
Appendix (copy of statutory text).
83. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 18-19, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
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2. Brill’s Concurrence/Dissent
In his partial concurrence and dissent, Chief Justice Brill
argued that the issuance of birth certificates to same-sex married
couples “on the same basis” as opposite-sex married couples was
“[t]he logical extension of Obergefell, mandated by the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.” 84 The Chief
Justice presented his argument by framing the issue “in light of
three scenarios:” artificial insemination with married couples,
artificial insemination with unmarried couples, and adoption. 85
Each scenario presents two couples, one same-sex with two
women and one opposite-sex, who wish to become parents.86
This Note will only address the first two scenarios in detail, as the
Chief Justice’s solution for the third is trivial: “Under the
rationale of Obergefell, both married couples are to be treated
equally. The law is now gender-neutral. . . .”87
In the first scenario, the couples are married. 88 Each uses
ART with an anonymous donor’s sperm, and each woman bearing
a child gives birth. 89 To the Chief Justice, the applicable statute
was section 9-10-201(a), the provision which directly addressed
artificial insemination and which the majority refused to
address.90 Under that statute, the sperm donor “has no legal
responsibility or rights to the child” of the opposite-sex couple,
and the birth certificate would name each member of that couple
as a parent, provided that the “husband” has consented in writing
to the artificial insemination. 91 But as for the same-sex couple,
the statutory language states “husband” instead of “spouse,”
excluding that couple from the ability to consent to the
84. Id. at 23, 505 S.W.3d at 183-84 (Brill, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
85. Id. at 23-26, 505 S.W.3d at 184-85. The scenario involving unmarried couples
was ultimately not pertinent to the United States Supreme Court’s decision, since Courtney
Kassell and Kelley Scott, the subjects of the Chief Justice’s second scenario, did not petition
for certiorari alongside their co-plaintiffs. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at II, Pavan v.
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (No. 16-992).
86. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 23-24, 26, 505 S.W.3d at 184-85.
87. Id. at 26, 505 S.W.3d at 185.
88. Id. at 23, 505 S.W.3d at 184.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 24, 505 S.W.3d at 184.
91. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2015).

2019

A CONSTELLATION OF BENEFITS

257

insemination for purposes of naming each spouse on the birth
certificate.92 Given that this first scenario applies to two of the
three couples and that the Circuit Court decreed the issuance of
their birth certificates pursuant to Obergefell without rewriting
the artificial insemination statute, 93 the Chief Justice “would
[have] remand[ed] this part of the circuit court’s order for
appropriate action.”94
In the second scenario, neither couple is married, but each
also uses artificial insemination to conceive and bear children. 95
Because neither couple is married at the time of artificial
insemination, neither may use section 9-10-201(a).96 To address
these couples, the Chief Justice first asks the question, “[a]fter
Obergefell, may the burden on the same-sex couple be greater
than the burden on the opposite-sex couple?”97 To Chief Justice
Brill, that burden is palpable within the applicable statute, section
20-18-406(a)(2), because its process for determining that a
“person has been legitimated” is “not obvious in the case of a
same-sex couple.”98 Nonetheless, the Circuit Court “exceeded its
authority in giving a court-ordered definition of the phrase
‘person has been legitimated,’” and furthermore “had no basis” to
strike section 20-18-401(e), (f).99 Even though the Chief Justice
stressed that “[l]egislative and executive actions are necessary to
provide what Obergefell requires,” he concurred with the
majority in its refusal to alter or reinterpret the statutes at issue.100
3. Justice Wood’s Concurrence/Dissent
Justice Wood also joined the court in its reversal of the
constitutional challenges to sections 20-19-401 and -406, but

92. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 24, 505 S.W.3d at 184 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 910-201(a)).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The Chief Justice here draws the term “artificial insemination” directly from
the statute. See supra note 26.
96. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 24, 505 S.W.3d at 184.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 25, 505 S.W.3d at 184 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2) (2014)).
99. Id. at 25, 505 S.W.3d at 185 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(a)(2)).
100. Id. at 25-26, 505 S.W.3d at 185.
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would have remanded the order instead of dismissing it. 101 For
Justice Wood, a remand would make sense under the federal court
doctrine of “prudential-mootness,” which she encouraged the
court to adopt. 102 Because the case was “fluctuating and
underdeveloped,” the court should have withheld relief in light of
“considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches
of government [that] counsel the court to stay its hand, and to
withhold relief it has the power to grant.” 103 Two developments
since the start of litigation, the State’s issuance of relief in the
form of “the appropriate birth certificates” and its concession that
the artificial insemination statute should comply with Obergefell,
“render the majority’s decision provisional.” 104 Because there
was such a change in both the material facts and the posture of
the State, Justice Wood argued that the court should have
remanded for the Circuit Court to consider these facts, 105 though
she agreed with Chief Justice Brill that the legislature could
address the issue as well, especially with the opportunity
presented by a remand. 106 Justice Wood also departed with the
majority’s interpretation of Obergefell, believing that under its
equal protection analysis, “states cannot constitutionally deny
same-sex couples the benefits of marital status, which include
equal access to birth certificates.” 107
4. Justice Danielson’s Dissent
Justice Danielson was the only justice to fully dissent from
the majority opinion. 108 He argued that both the Wright orders
and Obergefell compelled the result reached in the Circuit Court’s
order.109 First, Justice Danielson concluded that the Wright
injunction encompassed “all” the injunctive relief requested by
101. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 28, 505 S.W.3d at 186 (Wood, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.
1997)).
104. Id. at 29, 505 S.W.3d at 187.
105. Id. at 30-31, 505 S.W.3d at 187-88.
106. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 32, 505 S.W.3d at 188.
107. Id. at 32, 505 S.W.3d at 188-89.
108. Id. at 33, 505 S.W.3d at 189 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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the Wright plaintiffs, including the issuance of appropriate birth
certificates for children born of same-sex parents.110 Even though
the injunction failed to meet the specificity required by Rule
65(d)(1) and (e), Justice Danielson agreed with the Circuit Court
that this argument against Wright in the instant proceeding is an
impermissible collateral attack on the judgment. 111
Second, Justice Danielson concluded that the language,
principles, and history of Obergefell show that it extended the
benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.112 As applied to this
case, he reasoned that Obergefell requires “the inclusion of a
parent’s name on a child’s birth certificate” to “be accorded to
same-sex spouses and opposite-sex spouses with equal force.” 113
He also concluded that the majority’s holding that section 20-18401(f) “focus[es] on biological relationships rather than marital
ones” was in error. 114 For parents married “at the time of either
conception or birth or between conception and birth,” section 2018-401(f) presumptively names the “husband” of the mother on
the birth certificate as father of the child. 115 This parental
presumption, made “without regard to any biological relationship
and on the sole basis of [the father’s] marriage to the mother,”
was enacted for an “obvious” policy: “to legitimate children
whenever possible.”116
C. U.S. SUPREME COURT SUMMARY REVERSAL
1. Per Curiam Opinion
In the first sentence of its per curiam opinion in Pavan v.
Smith,117 the United States Supreme Court provides a simple
explanation for its summary reversal of the Arkansas Supreme
Court: “As this Court explained in Obergefell v. Hodges, . . . the
110. Id. (quoting Wright v. State, No. 60CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1998002, at *1 (Ark.
Cir. Ct. May 15, 2014), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 298
(per curiam)).
111. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 34, 505 S.W.3d at 189.
112. Id. at 34-35, 505 S.W.3d at 189-90.
113. Id. at 34-36, 505 S.W.3d at 189-90.
114. Id. at 35, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
115. Id. at 36, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
116. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 36, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
117. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
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Constitution entitles same-sex couples to civil marriage ‘on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.’”118 The
Court stressed that Obergefell contained a “commitment to
provide same-sex couples ‘the constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage.’” 119 It further reasoned that the
state court’s decision allows “differential treatment” in that the
State of Arkansas “need not . . . issue birth certificates including
the female spouses of women who give birth in the State.” 120 In
the Court’s view, the result of the state court’s opinion would be
that “same-sex parents in Arkansas lack the same right as
opposite-sex parents to be listed on the child’s birth certificate, a
document often used for important transactions like making
medical decisions for a child or enrolling a child in school.” 121
In Obergefell, the Court “held the relevant state laws
unconstitutional to the extent they treated same-sex couples
differently from opposite-sex couples.”122 The Court in Pavan
concluded that this holding “applies with equal force to [Arkansas
Code Annotated section] 20-18-401.”123 The Court answered the
argument of the State that “a birth certificate is simply a device
for recording biological parentage” rather than “a benefit that
attends marriage” by pointing to the statute’s requirement that the
“husband” of the birth mother of a child conceived by anonymous
sperm donation be placed on the birth certificate.” 124 Because the
husband “is definitively not the biological father” under such
circumstances, Arkansas “has thus chosen to make its birth
certificates more than a mere marker of biological
relationships.”125 The State instead uses the certificates “to give
married parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to
unmarried parents.”126

118. Id. at 2076 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)).
119. Id. at 2077 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2078.
122. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 3-4, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075
(No. 16-992), 2017 WL 1397395; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075
(No. 16-992), 2017 WL 587527).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2078-79.
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2. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissent
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
dissented in the belief that the case does not warrant “the strong
medicine of summary reversal.” 127 Because summary reversal
requires that “the decision below [be] clearly in error,” 128 he
addressed the challenge to section 20-18-401 by limiting the
scope of Obergefell’s “”holding to “the question whether a State
must recognize same-sex marriages.”129 To Justice Gorsuch,
“nothing in Obergefell spoke (let alone clearly) to the question
whether [section] 20-18-401 . . . must go.”130 He was convinced
that the rationales for biology-based birth registration regimes
proffered by the State “in no way offend Obergefell.”131 In his
view, the Arkansas Supreme Court opinion was not an act of
defiance, but rather an attempt to “earnestly engage
Obergefell.”132 And “to the extent they speak to the question at
all,” precedents suggest that birth registration “based on biology”
does not offend the Constitution, 133 and the Court’s opinion does
not “purport to identify any constitutional problem” with such a
regime.134
Justice Gorsuch then supposed that the Court issued
summary reversal because it was concerned instead with the
marriage-based artificial insemination exception to Arkansas’s
biology-based birth certificate regime. 135 Justice Gorsuch had
three problems with the use of section 9-10-201(a) for a summary
reversal.136 First, the couples “didn’t actually challenge [section]
9-10-201 in their lawsuit.”137 Second, the State conceded that the
benefits of section 9-10-201 “must be afforded equally” to all
127. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079-80 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2079 (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079.
133. Id. (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2079-80.
137. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079.
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couples, meaning that with the issuance of birth certificates to
Petitioners and those similarly situated, it is not clear what will
“happen on remand that hasn’t happened already.” 138 Third, in
the case of adoption, another exception to the biology-based birth
certificate regime, adopting parents are always eligible for
placement on birth certificates “without respect to sexual
orientation.”139 Because section 9-10-201 was not “fairly
challenged,” amending that statute by state supreme court order
would be “hardly the usual reward for seeking faithfully to apply,
not evade, this Court’s mandates.” 140 It is therefore a problem for
Gorsuch that this is the only “remedial suggestion” that he can
offer and that the Court offers none at all. 141
II. TWO RELEVANT LINES OF PRECEDENT
This section summarizes two lines of U.S. Supreme Court
precedent relevant to the courts’ reasoning in Pavan as the case
progressed from the Arkansas Circuit Court to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Part A concerns the line of cases leading up to and
including Obergefell that addressed the importance of the
material benefits of marriage with respect to a fundamental right
to marry.142 Part B involves the way in which laws based on
biological differences should be subject to heightened scrutiny for
compliance with equal protection. 143 As scholars have amply
argued, these purportedly “biological“ differences are usually
based in impermissible generalizations of gender, including social
roles and statistical generalities, as well as outright unfounded
stereotypes.144

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 2080.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See sources cited infra note 323.
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A. THE BENEFITS OF MARRIAGE
1. Loving, Zablocki, and Turner
In the six decades before the U.S. Supreme Court seriously
considered marriage as a right applicable to same-sex couples, the
Court defended the right to marry regardless of the race, 145 child
support status,146 or even imprisonment of a partner. 147 On this
last issue, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court in Turner v.
Safley, concluded that prison inmates without life sentences were
entitled to the right to marry. 148 In reaching the result, the Court
drew on a definition of a constitutionally significant marital
relationship that incorporates various attendant benefits of
marriage.149
Turner was the culmination of a trilogy of cases establishing
and defining the fundamental right to marry. 150 The first of these
was Loving v. Virginia, in which the Court famously invalidated
laws banning interracial marriage.151 That unanimous decision
rested on both equal protection and due process grounds, and it
was the due process ruling which provided constitutional law with
its first post-World War II defense of the marriage right. 152 Yet
Loving is rooted in the rather traditional rationale of ensuring
procreation, a policy expressed in the older cases it cites:
“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental
to our very existence and survival.” 153

145. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
146. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
147. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
148. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96; c.f. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974) (affirming
trial court’s denial of marriage to inmates sentenced to life imprisonment).
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96.
150. See id.; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-86; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
151. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
152. Id.; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . .”).
153. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); see also Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (“[Marriage] is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
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The second case of the trilogy, Zablocki v. Redhail, reaffirms
this policy while linking it to the even broader fundamental right
to privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.154 Invalidating
a Wisconsin statute which prevented noncustodial parentobligors of child support from marrying without a court order, the
Court recognized marriage’s placement on the same level as other
decisions of family life, including procreation, childbirth, child
rearing, and family relationships. 155 To the Court, it would have
made “little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to
enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our
society.”156 The Court in Zablocki thus linked marriage not only
to procreation but also to the social construct of the family
overall.157
In Turner, the right of most prisoners to marry, even without
the involvement of procreation or children, was protected because
the Court recognized an even broader scope to the spousal
relationship than it did in Zablocki.
To the Court, a
“constitutionally protected marital relationship” exists because
enough “important attributes of marriage” remain “unaffected by
the fact of confinement or the pursuit of legitimate corrections
goals.”158 Such elements not only include “religious and personal
aspects” but also legal “incidents of marriage” including
“government benefits (e.g. Social Security benefits), property
rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other,
less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of
wedlock).”159 Justice O’Connor thus culminated the trilogy of the
first modern marriage right cases with a constitutionally

purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”).
154. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-84; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . . Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred.”).
155. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87, 390-91 (citing Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)).
156. Id. at 386.
157. Id.
158. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
159. Id.
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significant definition of marriage made partly in terms of the
benefits conferred on the union by the government. 160
2. United States v. Windsor
In United States v. Windsor, the Court invalidated section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which limited the
federal definition of “marriage” to opposite-sex couples.161 The
statute thus denied the application of over 1,000 federal statutes
and regulations to lawfully married same-sex couples.162 The
plaintiff, Edith Windsor, filed suit to challenge the
constitutionality of DOMA because it barred her from claiming a
federal benefit of marriage to her late spouse, the estate tax
exemption for surviving spouses.163 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the Court, stated his argument in two components. First, DOMA
departed from the “history and tradition of reliance on state law
to define marriage” to the end of injuring a class protected by a
state.164 Second, this disruption of “the federal balance” violated
both Due Process and Equal Protection principles under the Fifth
Amendment by evidencing “a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group.”165
DOMA’s effect on federal benefits was a central
consideration for Justice Kennedy in both of these component
arguments.166 By its interference with the States’ interest in “the
definition and regulation of marriage,” DOMA rejected “the longestablished precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State,
though they may vary . . . from one State to the next.” 167 That
DOMA deviated from such tradition and operated to “deprive
same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come
with federal recognition of their marriages” was cited as strong
evidence of DOMA’s impermissible “purpose and effect of
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 95-96.
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749-52 (2013).
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 770 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)).
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752, 768-70.
Id. at 768.
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disapproval” of same-sex married couples. 168 By the operation of
denial of benefits, DOMA forced same-sex couples to live
“unmarried for the purpose of federal law” even with a state
license, and thus “DOMA undermine[d] both the public and
private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.”169
3. Obergefell v. Hodges
The Court made its attention to the state-provided benefits
of marriage more explicit as it held, in Obergefell v. Hodges,170
that same-sex couples were entitled to civil marriage “on the same
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”171 Eight of the
case’s fourteen plaintiff couples, and both plaintiff widowers,
challenged a state’s refusal to recognize an out-of-state marriage
license because the state denied the benefits which would
accompany such a license. 172 The widowers, James Obergefell
and David Michener, filed an injunction to require Ohio to list
their names as spouses on their husbands’ death certificates. 173
Four other Ohio couples sought recognition of their marriages on
their children’s birth certificates, and argued that Ohio’s refusal
to recognize their marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment
“no matter what marital benefit [was] affected.”174 Four
Kentucky couples sought to enjoin that state’s recognition ban
while citing its associated hardships, including “loss of tax
breaks” and “exclusion from intestacy laws.” 175 Indeed, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court characterized the petitioners’
motive for seeking recognized marriage as “their respect—and
need—for its privileges and responsibilities.”176
In its recognition of marriage as a fundamental right
protected under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited four “principles and
168. Id. at 770.
169. Id. at 772.
170. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
171. Id. at 2593, 2605.
172. Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397-99 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
173. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Deboer, 772 F.3d at 398.
174. Deboer, 772 F.3d at 398.
175. Id.
176. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (emphasis added).
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traditions” of its jurisprudence in its characterization of the
right.177 The fourth and final listed principle involved the nature
of marriage as “a keystone of our social order.” 178 The Court
explained that because marriage is such an essential institution of
American society, “society pledge[s] to support the couple,
offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and
nourish the union.”179 Although the Court noted that “States are
in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married
couples,” it drew a list of specific “governmental rights, benefits,
and responsibilities” of which states have “made marriage the
basis.”180 Thus the denial of “the constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage” to same-sex couples is itself a
“harm [that] results in more than just material burdens.” 181
The dissenting opinions did not deny that the availability of
government benefits was an aspect of marriage. 182 Chief Justice
Roberts noted his belief that his equal protection analysis, which
was not favorable to same-sex marriage in general, “might be
different . . . if [the Court was] confronted with a more focused
challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits.” 183 Likely as
a counter to this suggestion, the Court cautioned, “Were the Court
to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of the
required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex
couples, it still would deny gays and lesbians many rights and
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.” 184 Justice Alito,
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 2599-2602.
Id. at 2601.
Id. at 2601 (emphasis added).
Id. The Court listed several examples of such “aspects of marital status:”

[T]axation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession;
spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical
decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors;
birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child
custody, support, and visitation rules.
Id. (emphasis added).
181. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
182. Id. at 2623, 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting); id.
at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631, 2634-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Although the following remark may be
interpreted as sarcasm, the Chief Justice also invited those who support same-sex marriage
to “[c]elebrate the availability of new benefits.” Id. at 2626.
184. Id. at 2606 (majority opinion).
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meanwhile, in his defense of a “traditional” definition of marriage
linked to procreation, framed the definitional arguments of the
“different schools of philosophy” as explanations for “why
society should formalize marriage and attach special benefits and
obligations to persons who marry.” 185
Justices Scalia and Justice Thomas characterized the benefits
described by the court as “entitlements.”186 But while Justice
Scalia briefly dismissed such benefits as part of his rebuttal to the
Court’s conception of substantive due process,187 Justice Thomas
framed a large portion of his argument as a philosophical rejection
of liberty as “entitlement to government benefits.”188 And just as
the Court did, so Justice Thomas characterized the petitioners’
claims in terms of specific benefits, including “the State’s
imprimatur” in the form of “marriage licenses, death certificates,
and other official forms.”189
B. BIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND EQUAL
PROTECTION
In his defense of purely biology-based birth registration,
Justice Gorsuch relies on a constitutional history of cases which
uphold gender discrimination in regulation of the family on the
basis of purported biological factors.190 Yet the caselaw is neither
unanimous nor confident in its acceptance of biological
distinctions,191 and one of the opinions Justice Gorsuch cites,
Nguyen v. INS,192 inspired a particularly strong dissent from
Justice O’Connor and a large body of scholarly criticism.193 The
185. Id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
186. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
187. See id. at 2630 (“What say? What possible ‘essence’ does substantive due process
‘capture’ in an ‘accurate and comprehensive way’? It stands for nothing whatever, except
those freedoms and entitlements that this Court really likes. . . . Hardly a distillation of
essence.”).
188. Id. at 2631, 2634-37.
189. Id. at 2636.
190. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-125
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
191. See infra Section II.B.i-.ii.
192. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
193. See id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); sources cited infra note 313.
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currency of Nguyen as a defense of biology-based sex
discrimination is also limited by Sessions v. Morales-Santana, a
decision filed only two weeks before Pavan.194 Examining this
background, the analysis below first addresses the history of cases
relying on biological distinctions prior to Nguyen,195 followed by
the cases striking down gender discrimination laws that rely on
stereotypes,196 and finally the opinions in Nguyen and MoralesSantana.197
1. The “Biological” Difference Between Mothers and
Fathers
In its early application of the heightened scrutiny of Craig v.
Boren,198 the Court tended to tolerate gender differentiation on
the basis of “biological” differences, particularly where the laws
affected parenthood or were otherwise related to reproductive
biology.199 In fact, the Court at least once explicitly applied what
Kim Shayo Buchanan terms the “sex discount” of equal
protection review. 200 While upholding a statute precluding fathers
from suing for wrongful death of illegitimate children in Parham
v. Hughes, the plurality held that minimal rational-basis review
applies to sex discrimination unless there is some indication of
“invidious discrimination.”201 In a companion case, Caban v.
Mohammed, dissenting Justices Stewart and Stevens linked their
votes in the plurality of Parham to the supposed “biological“
differences between mothers and fathers in parenthood. 202

194. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017).
195. See infra Section II.B.i.
196. See infra Section II.B.ii.
197. See infra Section II.B.iii-.iv.
198. That well-traveled heightened scrutiny standard commands that gender
discrimination serve “important governmental objectives” and bear a substantial relationship
to those interests. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
199. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1176-81
(2010).
200. Id. at 1149.
201. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion). Justice Powell
arrived at the same result by purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, supplying the decisive
vote. Id. at 359-61 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
202. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397-99 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id.
at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Parham, 441 U.S. at 354-55 (plurality opinion).
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In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court further reasoned from
purportedly “biological“ principles to raise the bar of legal
recognition for unwed fathers above that of unwed mothers. 203 In
Lehr, Justice Stevens quoted Justice Stewart’s Caban dissent on
behalf of the Court: “The mother carries and bears the child, and
in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the
father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures.” 204
That bar was justified by the assumption that “for women,” as
Professor Douglas NeJaime has described it, “the social aspects
of parenthood . . . flow inevitably from the biological.” 205
Yet it should be noted that one of the cases that Justice
Gorsuch cited to support birth registration regimes “based on
biology” did not privilege biological relationships.206 In Michael
H. v. Gerald D., the Court upheld California’s conclusive marital
presumption as applied against a biological father attempting to
assert parentage over a child born from his extramarital affair
without the consent of the mother and her husband.207 Ironically,
when Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion, declared that
“California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood,”208 he protected a purely social parenthood
sanctioned by marriage above a biological parenthood that
actually involved significantly greater social investment. 209 In the
specific passage of Michael H. cited by Justice Gorsuch in
Pavan,210 Justice Scalia claimed that this presumption of
legitimacy for the husband over the natural father “was a
fundamental principle of the common law,” and that there was
nothing in such “older sources . . . addressing specifically the
power of the [unwed] natural father to assert parental rights”
superior to those of the husband. 211 Michael H. therefore follows

203. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
204. Id. at 260 n.16 (1983) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
205. Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L. J. 2260, 2280 (2017).
206. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
207. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-30 (1989) (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 118.
209. Id. at 113-15, 124.
210. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Michael H., 491 U.S.
at 124-25).
211. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-25.
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from a history supporting a doctrine that discounts, rather than
supports, biological connections. 212
2. The Anti-Stereotyping Principle
There were other cases in which the Court instead decided
to reject stereotypes and assumptions about the capacities of men
and women in all situations. In Craig v. Boren, the intermediatescrutiny standard was forged to overturn Oklahoma’s sexdifferentiated drinking ages in part because “social stereotypes”
were likely to “distort the accuracy” of the state’s purportedly
empirical statistical methodologies. 213 Cases prior to Craig had
already invalidated various parental restrictions on fathers
because of their motivation from similar stereotypes of the social
roles of the sexes. 214 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in which a
husband and stay-at-home father dependent on his wife’s earnings
fought for “mother’s benefits” after her death, was particularly
remembered by his attorney, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as the “most
critical” sex discrimination case decided in the 1970s.215
Shortly after appointment to the Court, Justice Ginsburg
would refine this anti-stereotyping doctrine with her majority
opinion in United States v. Virginia, the case which opened the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) to enrollment of women. 216
That opinion affirmed the “exceedingly persuasive justification,”
a somewhat higher form of intermediate scrutiny for gender
212. See id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that common law conclusive
marital presumption was formed in a time before blood tests could accurately prove
paternity); see also id. at 161 (White, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have now clearly recognized the
use of blood tests as an authoritative means of evaluating allegations of paternity.”).
213. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976).
214. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-39 (1975) (invalidating
statute on due process grounds which provided social security benefits based on earnings of
deceased spouse only to widows and children, excluding widowers); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 657-59 (1972) (concluding on both due process and equal protection grounds that
unmarried fathers are entitled to the same proceedings on parental fitness as unwed mothers
in dependency proceedings).
215. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 43 (1986); see also Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 NYU L. REV. 83, 132-42 (2010) (detailing
history of Wiesenfeld and other Burger Court cases establishing the anti-stereotyping
doctrine).
216. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
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classification which the Court first articulated in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan.217 By rejecting the state of
Virginia’s weak reasoning—that women could not generally cope
with the “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress,” and other challenges of
VMI’s “adversative method” 218—Justice Ginsburg condemned
and barred justifications relying on “overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and
females.”219
In the case of VMI, because some women could bridge the
physical gap and handle the social and psychological challenges
of the adversative method, no proffered general difference
between men and women could persuade the Court to allow
exclusively male admission. 220 As for whatever “inherent
differences” between the sexes remain, they are “cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex
or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” 221 To
the Court, one example of permitted gender classification would
be operating a single-sex college designed “to dissipate, rather
than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications.” 222 The Court
thus applies the “exceedingly persuasive justification” review and
anti-stereotyping doctrine to all gender classifications, including
those implicating “real” differences, as both sword and shield
against gender inequality. 223 It would be a sword for plaintiffs to
challenge governmental institutions relying on “overbroad
generalizations” of gender, and it would be a shield for
governments seeking to deconstruct gender roles through
legitimate gender classifications. 224

217. Id. at 532-33 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).
218. Id. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp.
1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)).
219. Id. at 533, 550-51 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 550-51.
221. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
222. Id. at 533 n.7 (quoting Brief of Twenty-six Private Women’s Colleges as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 941941, 94-2107), 1995 WL 702837).
223. Id. at 549, 556.
224. See id. at 533.
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3. Nguyen v. INS
Yet Justice Kennedy would later turn Justice Ginsburg’s
affirmation of the “[p]hysical differences between men and
women” back onto her and the other dissenters in Nguyen v.
INS.225 At issue was the constitutionality of an immigration
statute which puts a greater burden on the citizenship claim for a
nonmarital child when the child has a citizen father and a
noncitizen mother. 226 If the citizen parent is the mother, the child
acquires the mother’s nationality status at birth. 227 But for his
child’s citizenship, the citizen father must not only prove a
biological connection by clear and convincing evidence,228 but
also provide additional evidence of his social bond, such as
legitimation, a written acknowledgment of paternity, or
adjudication of paternity. 229
The Court had previously considered this statute in Miller v.
Albright and did not hold it unconstitutional, but the majority was
split between three opinions of two justices each. 230 Justice
Stevens, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his opinion
announcing the judgment, believed that the anti-stereotyping
principle of Virginia was only “indirectly involved in this case”
and that none of the premises of the statutory classification could
be “fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of a traditional
way of thinking about the members of either sex.”231 Justice
Stevens concluded that “[t]he biological differences between
single men and single women provide a relevant basis for
differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on
children born in foreign lands.” 232
In Nguyen, Justice Kennedy confirmed the applicability of
that biological basis on behalf of a slim, 5-4 majority.233 There,
225. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001) (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
226. Id. at 57-58.
227. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012).
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1).
229. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4).
230. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423-24 (1998) (Stevens, J.); id. at 445
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
231. Id. at 442, 444-45 (Stevens, J.).
232. Id. at 445.
233. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
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the Court purported to apply the standards of intermediate
scrutiny, including the “exceedingly persuasive justification”
standard of Hogan and Virginia.234 The Court then offered two
important governmental interests for the statutory distinction
between children of unwed citizen fathers and citizen mothers. 235
The first was “assuring that a biological parent-child relationship
exists.”236 Justice Kennedy observed that this relation was
“verifiable from the birth itself” in the mother’s case, but that the
father “need not be present at birth” and cannot incontrovertibly
verify paternity even with his presence. 237 The Court rejected the
challengers’ argument that it substitute gender-neutral DNA
testing, as Congress was not constitutionally required to “elect
one particular mechanism from among many possible methods of
establishing paternity, even if that mechanism arguably might be
the most scientifically advanced method.”238
The second important interest was to ensure the
“opportunity” for a parent-child relationship consisting of “real,
everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen
parent and, in turn, the United States.” 239 For a citizen mother,
such “opportunity” exists at the “initial point of contact” of
birth.240 But that opportunity is not a “biological inevitability”
for an unwed citizen father. 241 The Court expressed a particular
concern that a father might not know that he has a child and that
a mother might not know the father’s identity. 242 The Court then
provided another reason to reject the exclusive use of DNA
testing: that the proof of biological paternity “does nothing, by
itself, to ensure contact between father and child during the
child’s minority” and thereby satisfy the government interest in
social opportunity. 243

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 60-61, 70.
Id. at 62-68.
Id. at 62-64.
Id. at 62.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 67.
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At the conclusion of his analysis of the interests, Justice
Kennedy rejected the notion that the statute was based in gender
stereotypes because it was not a conclusion of “irrational or
uncritical analysis” to recognize that “the mother’s knowledge of
the child and the fact of parenthood [are] established [at birth] in
a way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.” 244 To
support the constitutional relevance of this observation, the Court
cited Justice Ginsburg’s statement in Virginia that “[p]hysical
differences between men and women . . . are enduring.”245
In her vigorous dissent, Justice O’Connor criticized the
Court on two fronts: first, the Court failed to apply the proper
standard of review; and second, the Court concealed and applied
the kinds of stereotypes that heightened scrutiny is designed to
eliminate.246 She emphasized that under intermediate scrutiny,
unlike rational basis review, the government has the burden to
prove an exceedingly persuasive justification, which means at
least an important, actual government interest and a means of
classification substantially related to that interest.247 Another
difference between heightened scrutiny and rational basis review
is the relevance of the availability of non-discriminatory
alternatives.248 Neither interest asserted by the Court had a
substantial fit,249 and one, the guarantee of “opportunity” for a
social parental bond, was diluted in weight from the actual
interest asserted by INS in formal proof of the bond in itself. 250
The requirement of proof for that opportunity also did not
substantially further the opportunity. 251 Sex-neutral alternatives,
such as DNA tests or documentation of the father’s presence at
birth, would be more effective in ensuring a biological record or
the opportunity for a parental relationship. 252
But Justice O’Connor’s most damning argument was her
demonstration that the government interest in the goal of a “real,
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 68.
Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
Id. at 74, 83-91 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 74-75.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 82-83.
Id. at 80, 88.
Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 80-81, 86.
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practical relationship” was only related to the statute by means of
a stereotype.253 The Court’s appeals to “biological” reality cover
for a generalization “that mothers are significantly more likely
than fathers . . . to develop caring relationships with their
children.”254 This generalization, that the mother was the “natural
guardian” of the nonmarital child, was Congress’s actual
motivation, just as it had been the force behind centuries of
common-law and statutory family regimes.255 The Court “relies
on ‘the very stereotype the law condemns,’ ‘lends credibility’ to
the generalization, and helps to convert that ‘assumption’ into a
‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’”256 Even the Court’s definition of a
stereotype to exclude only irrational “frame[s] of mind” was
constitutionally misframed. 257 Ever since Wiesenfeld, the Court
had historically invalidated overbroad generalizations with
empirical support “when more accurate and impartial functional
lines [could] be drawn.”258
4. Sessions v. Morales-Santana
In Morales-Santana, the Court appeared to vindicate Justice
O’Connor’s view of the anti-stereotyping principle when it struck
down a gender differential in immigration law related to the
statute at issue in Nguyen.259 Under the applicable immigration
rules, if a married couple of mixed citizenship had a child born
abroad, the child would become a citizen if the citizen parent was
physically present in the United States for five years before birth,
two of which after age 14. 260 This avenue was not open for unwed
citizen fathers, but the presence requirement was lowered to one
year before birth, with no age bracket, for unwed citizen
253. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 88-89.
254. Id. at 89 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 482-83 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
255. Id. at 91-92 (quoting To Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United
States: Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization,
76th Cong., 1st Sess., 431 (1940)).
256. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
257. Id. at 89-90.
258. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 90 (quoting Miller, 523 U.S. at 460 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
259. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
260. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012).
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mothers.261 In her majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg marked this
disparity as “gender-based” and “gender-biased.”262 In doing so,
she applied both the Virginia heightened scrutiny formulation of
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” and an additional
requirement that a classification “must substantially serve an
important governmental interest today.”263 The latter derives
from Justice Kennedy’s observation in Obergefell that in equal
protection analysis, the Court has historically “recognized that
new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified
inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” 264
The immigration statute’s differential treatment between
both men and women and the married and unmarried was justified
at its inception on the same “untenable” notion of the mother as
“natural and sole guardian of a nonmarital child” that was
condemned by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen.265 While
the Court recognized this rationale as the kind of “overbroad
generalizations” of gender “roles and abilities” that could not
survive heightened scrutiny, it notably did not consider that the
statute had any “biological” basis.266 The Court explicitly
mentioned Nguyen to distinguish rather than overrule it, but only
to point out that the parental-acknowledgment requirement was
not contested and was also “minimal” in comparison to the
physical-presence requirement. 267
III. ARGUMENT
A. THE ARKANSAS MAJORITY OPINION WAS
“CLEARLY IN ERROR”
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has never
articulated any clear standard of review for summary reversals,
Justice Gorsuch does not have an easy argument against the
261. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2012).
262. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76,
84 (1979)).
263. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)).
264. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603).
265. Id. at 1690-91.
266. Id. at 1692.
267. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694.
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Court’s decision here even with the standard he suggests.
Summary reversal, where the Court decides the merits of the case
simultaneously with its grant of certiorari, has long been
criticized,268 even if the practice is currently accepted.269 It is
“well established” that the Court “has never been[] primarily
concerned with the correction of errors in lower court
decisions.”270 Because the Court primarily acts in a lawmaking
capacity, it can also be problematic when a summary opinion
makes law, as it is “poorly suited to the task,” having had no
merits briefing and oral argument. 271
The opinion which Justice Gorsuch cites in Pavan,272 from
Schweiker v. Hansen,273 was one of many dissents by Justice
Marshall challenging the perceived abuse of summary disposition
by the Burger and early Rehnquist Courts.274 In his most
elaborate statement against the practice in Montana v. Hall,
Justice Marshall suggested that because “per curiam” means
“[b]y the court,” such opinions should be used only to “speak for
the entire Court on a matter so clear that the Court can and should
speak with one voice.”275 Otherwise, summary disposition
“deprive[s] the litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard.”276 This
is only one of a variety of arguments advanced by Justices across
the ideological spectrum against summary reversals both in
specific cases and in general. 277
Although it is now generally accepted that summary
disposition is appropriate for correcting clearly erroneous lower
268. Edward A. Hartnett, Summary Reversals in the Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 591, 592-93 (2016) (summarizing history of summary reversal up to the Roberts
Court).
269. STEPHEN M. S HAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 352 (10th ed. 2013).
270. Alex Hemmer, Student Essay, Courts as Managers: American Tradition
Partnership v. Bullock and Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 209, 212 (2013) (quoting Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts,
Address Before the American Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949)).
271. Id. at 212-13.
272. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
273. 450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
274. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 405 & n.1 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases).
275. Id. at 409.
276. Id. at 405.
277. See Hemmer, supra note 270, at 219-23, 211 n.9 (collecting and analyzing
summary dispositions).
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court decisions, 278 recent scholarship has been critical of the
Roberts Court’s relatively high ratio of summary reversal. 279 One
explanation is that the Court is acting in a “managerial capacity:”
that summary disposition is “a tool to manage and oversee” an
ever-larger docket of cert petitions. 280 Though such caseloadtrimming has the procedural advantages of a more efficient rate
of disposition, swift correction of egregious legal error, and
conservation of the Court’s finite resources, 281 it also sometimes
results in arguably imprudent decisions on the facts or careless
lawmaking.282 As Alex Hemmer argues, the Roberts Court’s
disposition of “notably fact-bound” cases runs against a tradition
of denying review to such cases, 283 and lawmaking without
adversarial presentation and plenary review runs the risk of
“rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions that may confuse
the lower courts.”284 Hemmer argues that although “the benefits
of a managerial approach are clear,” the Court should introduce
restrictions on summary disposition to control the risk of error. 285
Yet Hemmer also notes the curious disposition of one such
“managerial” case, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock,286 that was neither fact-bound nor legally contested, but
rather simply partisan in posture. 287 There, the Court, with five
votes, summarily reversed the Supreme Court of Montana
because the state court upheld an election statute which, with “no
serious doubt,”288 was subject to and violated Citizens United v.
278. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 269, at 234.
279. See Hartnett, supra note 268, at 593-94 (“[T]he odds of having a Supreme Court
merits decision handled summarily rather than with full briefing and argument are
considerably greater than having a Supreme Court merits decision at all.”); Ira P. Robbins,
Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86
TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (“In the first six years of Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, almost
nine percent of the Court’s full opinions were per curiams.”).
280. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 210.
281. Id. at 213.
282. See id. at 219-23.
283. Id. at 219 (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 16 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
284. Id. at 222 (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 349 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
285. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 223-24.
286. 567 U.S. 516 (2012) (per curiam).
287. Hemmer, supra note 270, at 224.
288. Bullock, 567 U.S. at 516.
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FEC.289 The four-member dissent did not only refuse to accept
Citizens United on its constitutional merit. 290 It also saw that
“Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere”
with independent campaign expenditures by corporations, “casts
grave doubt on the Court’s supposition” of the incorruptible
nature of independent expenditures.291 Though the violation was
indeed clear, and the majority clearly saw the law as “settled and
stable,” the dissent “certainly saw the law as anything but settled
and stable,” either because Citizen’s United was bad law at its
inception or because the emerging facts of campaign financing
discredited the decision’s value. 292
In Pavan, Justice Gorsuch does accuse the Court of
answering an unsettled legal question with bad lawmaking. 293
While the Court’s lawmaking exercise appears to have broad
strokes, Justice Gorsuch is effectively only disputing the language
of settled law with bare assertions of interpretation. His first
dispute with the Court concerns the scope of Obergefell: Justice
Gorsuch does not believe that Obergefell spoke “clearly,” or at
all, to the validity of Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-18401.294 By limiting Obergefell to its protection of marriage
recognition, Justice Gorsuch echoes the concern of the Arkansas
Supreme Court that the Circuit Court “conflated distinct
categories” of marriage and other rights when the latter
invalidated the statute. 295
Yet the Court’s decision is supported by more than a concern
for the limitation of its own holdings. Early cases recognizing the
right to marry, from Maynard v. Hill to Loving, all linked the
importance of marriage to the social necessity of procreation
within marriage.296 As discussed previously, Zablocki went
further and linked the right to marry with fundamental rights to

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010)).
Id. at 517 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Hemmer, supra note 270, at 224.
See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.
Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 16-17, 505 S.W.3d 169, 180.
See cases cited supra notes 150-153.
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procreation and to other incidents of the family. 297 States
administer birth certificates partly to record procreation or
adoption and ensure that the state gives parents all available
public benefits of having children within marriage. 298 Because
birth certificates are thus historically attendant on rights to the
incidents of the family,299 it does not make constitutional sense to
deny a birth certificate which fully recognizes a marriage where
the spouses mutually consent to the biological parenthood of one
and the functional parenthood of both. Such a position becomes
even less constitutionally tenable once one takes Turner into
account. In Turner, Justice O’Connor lists the “legitimation of
children born out of wedlock” as one of the legal incidents of the
protected marriage relationship. 300 As birth certificates are the
primary record of such legitimacy, 301 the legitimizing purpose of
marriage is certainly thwarted if both spouses cannot list their
names on a birth certificate for a child they conceived within the
marriage.
Obergefell itself cites all of these cases and yet does even
more to ensure an equality of benefits between same-sex
couples.302 In the same sentence in Obergefell where the Court
unambiguously makes a binding holding by overruling Baker v.
Nelson, it fashions a remedy: “[T]he State laws challenged by
Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they
exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms
297. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1978) (citing Carey v. Population
Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)).
298. See Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 396-98 (2014)
(“The birth certificate assigns, memorializes, and codifies the parent-child relationship as the
law constructs it. This creates a range of protections, freedoms, benefits, and obligations for
the parents and the child.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her
Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first Century, 5
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201, 213 (2009) (“[O]ur laws facilitate the formation of legal parental
relationships within the context of adult relationships recognized by law. This method of
assigning legal parentage is grounded in the expectation that the two members of the legally
cognizable adult relationship will raise the child.”).
299. Appell, supra note 298, at 396-97.
300. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
301. See Appell, supra note 298, at 393 (“The birth certificate literally signifies
legitimacy (or a lack thereof). . . . [T]he birth certificate continues to track the legal
relationship status of a child’s parents—a status that can affect the rights (and disabilities) a
child will have.”).
302. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2601 (2015).
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and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”303 In the previous two
sentences, the Court made its basic holding that the liberty of
marriage could no longer be denied to same-sex couples.304
Justice Gorsuch would have this be the only holding of
Obergefell and have that last sentence remain as dicta.305 But the
prescribed remedy is also a holding because it is the only remedy
the Court lays down. 306 Its unambiguous plain language extends
beyond marriage recognition alone to the entire contract between
the married family and society. 307 With the support of the full
factual and procedural context of Obergefell, the Court in Pavan
concluded that this holding was correct. 308 Precedent dating back
to Turner (and Zablocki, if only for benefits attending
procreation) further supports the Court’s holding. 309 Justice
Gorsuch, on the other hand, offers no support for his implied
303. Id. at 2604-05 (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 2604.
305. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
306. One of the narrowest definitions of “holding” as opposed to “dicta” is the
“necessity” definition: those parts of the opinion that are “necessary” to the result. See
Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
219, 223 & nn.24-26 (2010). If we define the Court’s “same terms and conditions” remedy
in Obergefell as the remedy, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605, then under a broad definition of
“necessary to the result,” that remedy is the holding because it is the result. See Stinson,
supra, at 223 (internal quotations omitted). But as scholars have noted, taking the necessity
approach to its logical conclusion would “not allow a case to have precedential weight as
applied to any other case.” Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK.
L. REV. 661, 676 (2018). For that reason, modern scholars reject both the “necessity”
approach and the “pure” limitation of a case to its facts and outcome. Id. at 674-75, 704.
Yet under the more manageably narrow “material” facts-and-outcome approach suggested
by Arthur Goodhart—which finds the “principle of the case” in the facts treated as material
and the decision based on them—the Obergefell remedy is still a holding. Arthur Goodhart,
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 181-83 (1930). Goodhart’s
most relevant principle of “materiality” here is that “[i]f the opinion does not distinguish
between material and immaterial facts,” then all facts in an opinion are material. Id. at 182.
Because Obergefell neither explicitly delineates material facts nor “impliedly treats”
particular facts as immaterial, see id., one may conclude that the plaintiffs’ desire for marital
benefits and the “aspects of marital status” listed by the Court were both “material” facts.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594-95, 2601 (emphasis added). Because the invalidation of
statutes limiting the right to marry “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex
couples” impliedly follows from these facts, that remedy is a holding. Id. at 2605; But see
generally Michaels, supra (critiquing various holding/dicta models, including Goodhart’s,
and offering his own).
307. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
308. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2076, 2078-79.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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contention that this guarantee of a social contract between two
spouses and a state is only the dicta of Obergefell.310
Justice Gorsuch follows his misguided analysis of
Obergefell’s scope with a few other unsupported assertions. He
does not argue that any court beyond this case has held that
reasons for biology-based birth registration regimes exist which
“in no way offend Obergefell.”311 Justice Gorsuch instead recites
the State’s arguments and approves of “biological” birth
registration regimes with citation to two cases predating
Obergefell and addressing distinct questions of law.312 And
without fully addressing the Court’s guarantee of a social contract
between the marriage and the state, Justice Gorsuch simply
asserts that Arkansas law creates a biology-based birth
registration regime and that Obergefell does not address purely
biology-based birth registration regimes. 313
As the Court and Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Danielson
both adequately explain, Arkansas’s birth certificate statutes tie
birth certificates to marriage, and not only to biology. 314 While
the Court points to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10201(a), the statute imputing paternity to the husband with
conception by anonymous sperm donation,315 Justice Danielson
cuts even deeper to the statute actually at issue, section 20-18401(f).316 The statute establishes the kind of presumption of
paternity in marriage that the Court upheld in Michael H. v.
Gerald D.,317 in which the husband was presumed the father until
a court or the mother rebuts that presumption. 318

310. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch J., dissenting).
311. Id.
312. Id. (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 124-125 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
313. Id.
314. See id. at 2078-79 (majority opinion); Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 35-36,
505 S.W.3d 169, 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
315. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
316. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 35-36, 505 S.W.3d at 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
317. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117-18, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed 1994)).
318. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2014) (presumption rebuttable
with paternity adjudication or affidavits executed by mother, husband, and putative father),
with CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (presumption rebuttable with blood test performed pursuant to
motion by husband or mother within two years of birth).
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The Court may have decided to recognize broader relevant
boundaries to the Arkansas birth registration regime than Justice
Danielson did in order to avoid unnecessarily applying Michael
H. to the case or reviving its constitutional questions.
Nonetheless, the primary utility of the parental presumption as a
protector of social institutions, marriage and family, is
unassailable.319 That policy, which Justice Danielson called
“obvious,” renders the parental presumption an incident of
marriage even if birth certificates were designed to also
accurately record biological descent. 320 Because the Arkansas
Supreme Court instead read a pure biological basis into the birth
certificate regime, 321 it was in clear legal error with respect to its
method of statutory interpretation.
Justice Gorsuch neither cites any authority which directly
contradicts the Court on its broader interpretation of Obergefell
nor otherwise provides a convincing rebuttal to the substantive
holding of Pavan. He has thus presented a case against summary
reversal even weaker than the American Tradition Partnership
dissent, characterized by shaky statutory interpretation rather than
adequate support for legal dispute or bold broadsides against the
underlying doctrine behind same-sex marriage. If Justice
Gorsuch only took the route of American Tradition Partnership
and simply rejected Obergefell, he would have had plenty of
rhetorical ammunition, courtesy of Obergefell’s dissenting
opinions.322 But even if Justice Gorsuch did that, the Court and
the facts nonetheless show the clear error in the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s decision.

319. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 36, 505 S.W.3d at 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 35, 505 S.W.3d at 190.
322. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2626-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640-43
(Alito, J., dissenting).
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B. HOW PAVAN AND MORALES-SANTANA LIMIT
NGUYEN
Scholars have largely backed Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Nguyen ever since the decision was handed down. 323 While
sharing the concerns she expressed, some also attributed
concealed rationales to the majority, including the unsympathetic
character of the petitioner and a deference towards Congress’s
plenary power over immigration. 324 And since even before
Morales-Santana was decided, scholars have anticipated that it or
a similar decision would limit the application of Nguyen in both
immigration law and the more general family law context. 325 As
323. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1187, 1192-93, 1219-21 (2016) (citing Nguyen as an example of the “inferior” legal status
of unwed fathers derived from equal protection doctrine focused on integration of the family
and the market, rather than individual liberty); Buchanan, supra note 199, at 1182-85
(arguing the Court applied a “sex discount” in Nguyen to purported heightened scrutiny to
accommodate cultural assumptions that men have a “biologically-programmed” indifference
to their children and that this apathy is “cured” by marriage); David B. Cruz, Disestablishing
Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1085 (2002) (arguing that feminist analyses against
“sex/gender ideologies” would help the Court avoid “mistakes” such as Nguyen); Russell K.
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 208-10 (2016) (agreeing with Justice
O’Connor’s criticisms, noting that Justice Kennedy “transgressed doctrinal boundaries” of
heightened scrutiny and that the stereotype he advanced was a “paternalistic conception of
mothers”); Jung Kim, Comment, Nguyen v. INS: The Weakening of Equal Protection in the
Face of Plenary Power, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 43, 54 (2002) (“[T]he Court glaringly
reveals its own limitations and prejudices regarding its archaic notions of women and men,
mothers and fathers.”).
324. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 215, at 148 n.352 (pointing to the Court’s
reiteration without judgment of Justice Stevens’s suggestion in Miller that a more deferential
standard of review was appropriate for an exercise of Congress’s immigration and
naturalization power); Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A
Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835, 836 (2002) (suggesting that if the
Court did not implicitly account for the immigration context, the Court would not likely have
sustained an overt sex-based classification as “overbroad and ill matched to its objective” as
the distinction drawn by the statute); Kim, supra note 323, at 58-59, 62-63 (surmising that
the Court was holding Nguyen accountable for his child sexual assault convictions and
noting signs of the Court’s “discomfort” with challenging congressional plenary power).
325. The residency requirements at issue in Morales-Santana were previously
reckoned with by the Court in Flores-Villar v. United States, but that decision only affirmed
the Ninth Circuit by an equally divided Court thanks to Justice Kagan’s recusal. FloresVillar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (per curiam) aff’g 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
One commentator speculated that if a challenge to the statute again arrived, the Court would
overrule Nguyen or at least resolve its tension with Virginia in the latter’s favor. Stephen
Kanter, Essay, Brevity is the Soul of Wit: Nguyen is Dead, 16 LEWIS & C LARK L. REV. 1305,
1314-15 (2012). After the Court granted certiorari in Morales-Santana, Professor Douglas
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Professor Kristin Collins argues in her commentary on MoralesSantana, for which she co-wrote an amicus brief,326 Justice
Kennedy’s choice of employing a “watered-down” equal
protection analysis as if it were any other nonimmigration statute
(i.e., without invocation of the plenary power doctrine) led to it
becoming “easily enlisted as a precedent in domestic family law
cases” involving the gender-based regulation of parentage and the
family in general. 327
Absent the intervention of the Court, the state court decision
in Pavan would have joined this cohort of successful application
of the pseudo-biological reasoning of Nguyen to state family law.
Given that Justice Gorsuch approved of Nguyen’s analysis, and
given that Morales-Santana did not overrule or explicitly limit its
logic, Nguyen still presents a palpable threat to the equal status of
same-sex couples in parenthood. Both scholars and some lower
courts have attacked the philosophical premise of Nguyen and
similar cases rendering legal significance to “real” gender
differences.328
Any further philosophical or pre-Nguyen
constitutional attack by this author on Nguyen would be
redundant and unoriginal. It would also not be as powerful as an
application of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Advocates
for recognition of functional same-sex parenthood outside of
biological motherhood must find some post-Nguyen answer by
the Court to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent. This need is demonstrated
NeJaime predicted that if the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision, it would possibly
“begin to question the wisdom of relying on biological justifications to distinguish between
motherhood and fatherhood for purposes of family law.” NeJaime, supra note 205, at 2354.
And once the decision came, Professor Kristin Collins argued that Morales-Santana does
limit Nguyen’s application. Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in
Morales-Santana, 131 HARV. L. REV. 170, 199-200 (2017). One should be careful to temper
speculation about the Court’s future direction on this issue however, given that Justice
Gorsuch did not participate in Morales-Santana and given the likelihood of a future Supreme
Court appointment during the presidency of Donald Trump. Id. at 201 n.185.
326. Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of History, Political Science, and Law in
Support of Respondent, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (No. 15-1191),
2016 WL 5800340.
327. Collins, supra note 325, at 195; see, e.g., Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe,
125 P.3d 461, 470 (Haw. 2005); Grimes v. Van Hook-Williams, 839 N.W.2d 237, 245-46
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013); Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 308 (Ct. App. 2006).
328. See, e.g., Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1265-66
(D. Colo. 2016) (endorsing the empowering treatment of “real” gender differences in
Virginia and ignoring Nguyen to invalidate an ordinance prohibiting public female breast
exposure).
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by the fact that other lawyers continue to use Nguyen to privilege
biological over nonbiological parents, even after MoralesSantana and Pavan.329
Kristin Collins convincingly argues that Morales-Santana
helps these advocates advance part of the way towards an
answer.330 The majority opinion offered a “clear account of the
gender-based stereotypes concerning parental roles that have
shaped the derivative citizenship statute in its every detail.” 331
“[W]ithout so much as blinking,” Collins notes, “the Court held
that it would approach ‘all gender-based classifications’ with the
same judicial skepticism.” 332 From this posture, she posits a
“significant tension” between laws privileging the biological
mother’s position as “natural guardian” above the rights and
responsibilities of nonbiological parents, on the one hand, and
“Morales-Santana’s deep skepticism of gender-based allocations
of parental rights and status,” on the other. 333 She also points to
the Court’s “modernizing message” that gender-based
distinctions must “serve an important governmental interest
today,” noting that this “forward-looking understanding of
equality” was lifted from Obergefell.334 Collins predicts that
advocates for recognition of “the various functional parenting
relationships that exist outside of . . . biological motherhood”—
including those of same-sex couples and their children—will use
Morales-Santana to compel judges and legislators to attend to
“unjustified” forms of inequality which have previously “passed
unnoticed and unchallenged.” 335
Indeed, the patently heteronormative logic of Nguyen’s
“natural guardian” narrative is laughably anachronistic in the face
of two-mother parenthood, where the non-biological mother’s
329. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Movants-Intervenors-Appellants at 18, Witt v. Witt, No.
E2017-00884-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1505485 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018), 2017 WL
6888042; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-13, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S. Ct.
1165 (2018) (No. 17-878), 2017 WL 6508408.
330. Collins, supra note 325, at 202-03.
331. Id. at 173.
332. Id. at 174 (quoting Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017)).
333. Id. at 203.
334. Id. at 200 (quoting Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (citing Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015))).
335. Collins, supra note 325, at 203 (quoting Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1684
(quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603)).
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parental involvement is usually assured by the fact that
conception involves many more practical and legal steps than one
single session of unprotected sex. 336 But in Pavan, the State of
Arkansas did not offer the possibility of the nonbiological
mother’s lack of presence at birth as its biological rationale.
Rather, the State attempted to explain that the birth certificate
regime was only a genetic record made to advance the child’s
health and potential legal rights.337 Such an exclusionary
contention—that the scheme could only be a genetic record—was
easily dispelled by the Court when it pointed to the exceptions
with a marriage- or adoption-protecting operation. 338 Nguyen
relied on precedent that also posited purportedly “biological“
motivations to statutes which, like those involved in Nguyen,
were stirred by and protected gender roles in parenting. 339
The application by Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito of
Nguyen to “biology based” policies with a narrower and more
“purely” biological rationale, protecting health through genetic
records,340 seems at first glance an acceptably restrained use of
Nguyen, as there is no stereotype involved in the basic facts of
genetics. Though it is arguably an overbroad generalization to
presume that fathers will not be present at birth, it is only fact that
the parent contributing sperm in conception may pass unhealthy
genes to the child. 341 The problem with assuming Justice
336. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 494-95 (Ariz.
2017) (presenting facts where both partners attempt to conceive using anonymous sperm
donors, parents enter into “joint parenting agreement” to ensure rights pre-Obergefell,
nonbiological mother stays home to raise the child for first two years, and the same mother
sues to enforce the parenting agreement).
337. See Defendant’s Reply, supra note 49, at 8-9.
338. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (per curiam).
339. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 260 n.16 (1983)); see also Ben-Asher, supra note 323, at 1231-32 (noting that equal
protection claims in cases like Lehr “often fail” because of perceptions of biological
differences).
340. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
341. Through “multifactorial” inheritance, a combination of multiple genes and
environmental factors may lead to common disorders like heart disease, high blood pressure,
Alzheimer’s disease, arthritis, diabetes, cancer, and obesity. See Melissa Conrad Stöppler,
Genetic Diseases (Inherited) Symptoms, Causes, Treatments, and Prognosis,
MEDICINENET.COM,
https://www.medicinenet.com/genetic_disease/article.htm
[https://perma.cc/YRN6-Z9WQ] (last visited May 17, 2018). The effects of “epigenetic
inheritance patterns,” changes made to gene expression by experiences and habits, are
increasingly under close study. See J.R. Thorpe, How a Man’s Health Affects the Genetics
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Gorsuch’s restraint of Nguyen is that he was wrong to argue a
purely biological logic behind the State’s motivation, since the
statutory scheme was not purely a genetic record on several
fronts.342 Justice Gorsuch is actually expanding the application
of Nguyen to whatever laws he sees fit, even if the facts do not
support his analysis. The analytical posture of the three
dissenting votes thus presents itself as substantial competition to
Morales-Santana, which limits Nguyen to its facts by affirming
Virginia’s application to all gender-based classifications. 343
Further change in the ideological composition of the Court could
thus easily result in the expansion of Nguyen at the expense of
Morales-Santana and Virginia.
Because “Morales-Santana certainly will not do all the
work” in challenging the gendered pseudo-biological logic of
Nguyen, we must propose additional tools for the task.344 And for
married individuals seeking to claim status as parents of the
biological children of their same-sex spouses, the Pavan majority
offers that tool, especially when used in conjunction with
Morales-Santana.345 Before Obergefell, states’ defense counsel
sometimes used Nguyen to respond to arguments that the
prohibition of same-sex marriage or limitations on the rights of
lawful same-sex spouses constituted sex discrimination. 346 With
Pavan, there is no more room for states to prevent same-sex
spouses from embracing the rights that opposite-sex spouses
enjoy.347
The Pavan majority emphasized Obergefell’s protection of
“civil marriage ‘on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex
couples’” with no qualifiers. 348 The list of “terms and conditions”
was not simply made to support Obergefell’s application of the
fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples, as the Arkansas
of His Offspring, BUSTLE (May 16, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/160983-how-amans-health-affects-the-genetics-of-his-offspring [https://perma.cc/LL9N-476L] (collecting
studies).
342. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (section 9-10-201); Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark.
437, at 35-36, 505 S.W.3d 169, 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (section 20-18-401(f)(1)).
343. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017).
344. Collins, supra note 325, at 203.
345. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79; Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1689.
346. See Collins, supra note 325, at 195 n.152 (collecting briefs).
347. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
348. Id. at 2076 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)).
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majority supposed. 349 Rather, Obergefell entitles same-sex
couples to all “rights, benefits, and responsibilities” of marriage
that are established for opposite-sex couples, not simply marriage
recognition.350 Used on its own, this absolute command to award
a right to same-sex couples where the right attends opposite-sex
marriage should call courts to deeply scrutinize claims of a law’s
“biological” motivation. The Pavan majority itself went to great
lengths to dispel the State’s conception of its birth certificate
regime as a purely genetic registry; it traversed traditional
boundaries of statutory review by invoking statutes that were not
at issue in the case but were nonetheless components of a larger
birth certificate system. 351
One of the few lower court decisions that has so far relied on
Pavan did so, like the Pavan majority, by sidestepping a
philosophical confrontation with Nguyen’s premises in favor of
direct application of Pavan’s absolute expansion of Obergefell.352
In McLaughlin v. Jones in and for County of Pima, the Arizona
Supreme Court expanded the statutory presumption of paternity
to any woman whose wife gives birth to a child during the
marriage.353 In that case, a non-biological mother, Suzan
McLaughlin, filed for dissolution of her marriage to birth mother
Kimberly McLaughlin, legal decision-making in loco parentis,
and “parenting time.”354 The trial court relied on Obergefell to
apply to Suzan the same presumption of paternity “that applies to
a similarly situated man in an opposite-sex marriage.”355
Although the intermediate appellate court affirmed, 356
another division of that court reached a contrary result in Turner
v. Steiner.357 That court concluded that a female same-sex spouse
349. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 10, 505 S.W.3d 169, 176-77.
350. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
351. Id. at 2077-79 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2015)).
352. McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz. 2017).
353. Id. at 498.
354. Id. at 494-95. In Arizona, “parenting time” is a statutory term for what is
traditionally known as parental visitation. ARIZ. REV. S TAT. ANN. § 25-401(5) (2019); Owen
v. Blackhawk, 79 P.3d 667, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). “Visitation” is defined separately as
a third-party child access schedule. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401(7).
355. McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 495.
356. McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 382 P.3d 118, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2016).
357. Turner v. Steiner, 398 P.3d 110, 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
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could not benefit from the presumption of paternity, due to its
basis in the biological differences between men and women, and
that Obergefell imposed no contrary requirement. 358 There, the
majority not only relied on Nguyen,359 but also borrowed from the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Pavan by imposing the latter’s
constricted limitation of Obergefell to marriage recognition. 360
The dissenting judge believed that a gender-neutral interpretation
was consistent with Obergefell’s recognition that the right to
marry provides “profound benefits” to children raised by samesex couples.361
In light of Pavan and its own interpretation of Obergefell,
the Arizona Supreme Court abrogated Turner and held the
paternity
presumption’s
gender-specific
application
unconstitutional.362 The legal parent status conferred by the
paternity presumption was “undoubtedly[] a benefit of marriage,”
and the gender-specific language of the statute authorized
“differential treatment of similarly situated same-sex couples.”363
Although the court assumed the constitutional validity of
Nguyen’s argument that “fathers and mothers are not similarly
situated with regard to proof of biological parenthood,” it
disclaimed any relevance of biological parentage to the facts. 364
For the court, Nguyen did not apply to facts where “males and
females are similarly situated but treated differently.”365 Justice
Bolick, partially concurring, recognized that equitable
considerations may favor Suzan’s parenting rights, but he
nonetheless dissented from the court’s “rewrit[ing]” of the
paternity statute.366 He would have affirmed the constitutionality
of its existing form, citing Nguyen.367 Justice Bolick also implied
that Pavan only condemns “the absence of a mechanism to
358. Id. at 113-16.
359. Id. at 115 (citing Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001)).
360. Id. at 114 (citing Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at 9-10, 505 S.W.3d 169, 17677).
361. Id. at 117 (Winthrop, J., dissenting) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2600 (2015)).
362. McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz. 2017).
363. Id. at 497.
364. Id. at 498 (quoting Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 54).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 503 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
367. McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 503 (citing Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63).
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provide parenthood opportunities to single-sex couples on equal
terms.”368
Likely for the sake of judicial economy, the McLaughlin
majority missed an opportunity to challenge the pseudobiological premise of Nguyen in light of the stricter equal
protection analysis affirmed in Morales-Santana. As a result, the
defendant birth mother, Kimberly, was left free to use both
Nguyen and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Pavan to support the
central argument of her petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court.369 There, she interpreted the paternity statute as having an
exclusively biological basis and accepted Justice Gorsuch’s
Nguyen-inflected contention that “nothing in Obergefell indicates
that a birth registration regime based on biology . . . offends the
Constitution.”370 But not only did Kimberly gloss over the social
functions of the paternity presumption, such as the protection of
marriage and the parental rights of the spouse married to the birth
mother;371 she also failed to reckon with Morales-Santana and its
broad application to all gender-based classifications.372 It would
have been interesting to see whether the Court would have closely
considered Kimberly’s arguments, but the Court instead denied
her petition, leaving the constitutional merit of Nguyen and
Justice Gorsuch’s Pavan dissent in ongoing contention.373
Some of the other briefs and motions discussing either
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent or some other conjunction between
Nguyen and Pavan have also bypassed the Morales-Santana test
and accepted Justice Gorsuch’s assumption of the importance of
a biological basis to a birth registration regime in constitutional
review of those statutes. 374 On the other hand, there is one federal
368. Id.
369. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, 7, 11-13, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S.
Ct. 1165 (2017) (No. 17-878), 2017 WL 6508408.
370. Id. at 7 (quoting Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting)).
371. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-27, 130 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“Here, to provide protection to an adulterous father is to deny protection to a marital
father.”).
372. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017).
373. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S. Ct. 1165, denying cert. sub nom. to
McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017).
374. See Reply Brief of Movants-Intervenors-Appellants, at 18, Witt v. Witt, No.
E2017-00884-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1505485 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2018), 2017 WL
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district court brief that this author has found which does integrate
Morales-Santana and Pavan into the same constitutional
analysis.375 That brief was written for Arroyo Gonzalez v.
Rossello Nevares, a case that does not involve same-sex marriage,
but does implicate both birth certificates and another issue of
LGBT rights.376
Before the district court’s ruling in April 2018, Puerto Rico
denied birth certificate amendments to transgender persons that
accurately reflect their gender identities without revealing their
transgender status.377 In support of their motion for summary
judgment, the Arroyo Gonzalez plaintiffs cited Virginia and
Morales-Santana for their challenge to Puerto Rico’s Birth
Certificate Policy as sex discrimination in violation of equal
protection.378
In their criticism of the Commonwealth’s
purported government interest in providing a “historical X-ray
document of the person at birth,”379 the plaintiffs pointed to the
statutory substitution, upon adoption, of a certificate including
only adoptive parents’ names for the original birth certificate. 380
Puerto Rico had, like Arkansas in Pavan, chosen to give a
significance to birth certificates beyond biology. 381 Although
these plaintiffs, like other litigants, have chosen not to directly
challenge the flawed premises of Nguyen or Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent, they have nonetheless utilized Pavan to rebut arguments
for the existence of a purely biology-based birth records
regime.382 The district court ultimately ruled in the plaintiffs’
favor on separate constitutional grounds, but the Commonwealth

6888042; but see also Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at 37-38, Ermold v. Davis, Nos.
17-6119, 17-6233 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2018), 2018 WL 572796 (conceding that Obergefell was
“unclear” as to rights other than marriage itself, but also emphasizing that the latter right was
“clearly established” in Obergefell).
375. Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2-6, Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327
(D.P.R. 2018) (No. 3:17-CV-01457) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum], 2017 WL
6398353.
376. Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327, 328 (D.P.R. 2018).
377. Id.
378. Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum, supra note 375, at 3-4.
379. Id. at 5.
380. Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 1136 (2017)).
381. Id. (citing Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (per curiam)).
382. Id. (citing Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79).
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might appeal to the First Circuit. 383 It will be interesting to see
how far the Arroyo Gonzalez plaintiffs, along with other
transgender plaintiffs seeking birth certificate changes, take their
analyses of Morales-Santana and Pavan in the future.
Understandably, litigants on behalf of spouses in same-sex
marriages and their children may not have the resources to revive
a challenge to Nguyen after Morales-Santana in any context other
than deportation proceedings involving the parental
acknowledgment requirements. They may also believe that the
Court in Morales-Santana did not do enough to limit Nguyen’s
application to “biology-based family law even if it rejected the
myth of birth mother as “natural guardian,” one of Nguyen’s
pseudo-biological premises. 384 But as Justices Gorsuch, Thomas,
and Alito push to find purportedly “biological“ government
interests using even weaker arguments than that of Nguyen,385
these litigants should find any way possible to limit them in order
to succeed.
Nguyen and its precedents upheld sexist,
heteronormative stereotypes cloaked as purportedly “biological“
truisms.386 Both the broad anti-stereotyping principle of MoralesSantana and the wide-ranging and absolute Obergefell
interpretation held by the Pavan majority provide tools to protect
the rights of married same-sex parents from the dangers of
broadly applying these cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pavan v. Smith is a rare kind of summary reversal for the
Supreme Court for three reasons. First, it engages in what first
appears to be unusually broad lawmaking for a summary
reversal.387 Second, it renders this broad expansion of Obergefell
with a compelling, yet simple argument—that the broad scope of
the right to marry was already made plain in Obergefell.388 But
finally, and most importantly, its dissent demonstrates the broader
383. Arroyo Gonzalez v. Rossello Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 327, 333-34 (D.P.R. 2018).
384. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1691 (2017) (citing Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 91-92 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
385. See discussion supra Section III.A.
386. See discussion supra Section III.B.
387. See Hemmer, supra note 270, at 221-23.
388. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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doctrinal character of a new justice and foreshadows the way the
Court could potentially treat Obergefell and its broader
constitutional sphere. 389 The Court in Pavan confirms that samesex couples can now light on every star in a “constellation of
benefits” of marriage. 390 Meanwhile, Justice Gorsuch confirms
his denial of any right to these material benefits while offering no
alternative.391 The Court in Morales-Santana repudiates all
stereotypes and “overbroad generalizations” used to justify
gender discrimination. 392 Yet Justice Gorsuch in Pavan shows he
is willing to apply Nguyen to disregard statutory text and possibly
defend stereotypes, all to help justify a state’s proffered
“biological“ distinctions. 393
Advocates should be optimistic for the power of Pavan to
defend married same-sex couples and similar parties from the
discriminatory encroachment of governments on their birth
certificates and other rights attending marriage. 394 But because
the Court may ideologically shift in the future of the Trump
Administration, advocates should also attempt to limit the force
of Justice Gorsuch’s future use of Nguyen by meeting him with
Morales-Santana and, where applicable, Pavan.
Both a
constellation of benefits and a universe of equal protection may
depend on whether the legal community will treat Pavan’s
diminutive opinion and dissent with the seriousness they deserve.
BRAD ALDRIDGE

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See Collins, supra note 325, at 201 n.185.
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per curiam).
Id. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692-93 (2017).
Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2079 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See discussion supra Section III.B.
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APPENDIX
Arkansas Code Annotated § 20-18-401(e), (f) (2014)
(e) For the purposes of birth registration, the mother is
deemed to be the woman who gives birth to the child, unless
otherwise provided by state law or determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction prior to the filing of the birth certificate.
The information about the father shall be entered as provided in
subsection (f) of this section.
(f) (1) If the mother was married at the time of either
conception or birth or between conception and birth the name of
the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the
child, unless:
(A) Paternity has been determined otherwise by a
court of competent jurisdiction; or
(B) The mother executes an affidavit attesting that
the husband is not the father and that the putative father
is the father, and the putative father executes an
affidavit attesting that he is the father and the husband
executes an affidavit attesting that he is not the father.
Affidavits may be joint or individual or a combination
thereof, and each signature shall be individually
notarized. In such event, the putative father shall be
shown as the father on the certificate and the parents
may give the child any surname they choose.
(2) If the mother was not married at the time of either
conception or birth or between conception and birth, the name of
the father shall not be entered on the certificate of birth without
an affidavit of paternity signed by the mother and the person to
be named as the father. The parents may give the child any
surname they choose.
(3) In any case in which paternity of a child is determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, the name of the father and
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surname of the child shall be entered on the certificate of birth in
accordance with the finding and order of the court.
(4) If the father is not named on the certificate of birth, no
other information about the father shall be entered on the
certificate.
Arkansas Code Annotated § 20-18-406(a)(2) (2014)
(a) The State Registrar of Vital Records shall establish a
new certificate of birth for a person born in this state when he or
she receives the following:
...
(2) A request that a new certificate be established
and any evidence, as required by regulation, proving
that the person has been legitimated, or that a court of
competent jurisdiction has determined the paternity of
the person or that both parents have acknowledged the
paternity of the person and request that the surname be
changed from that shown on the original certificate.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-10-201 (2015)
(a) Any child born to a married woman by means of
artificial insemination shall be deemed the legitimate natural child
of the woman and the woman’s husband if the husband consents
in writing to the artificial insemination.
(b) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a
woman who is married at the time of the birth of the child shall
be presumed to be the child of the woman giving birth and the
woman’s husband except in the case of a surrogate mother, in
which event the child shall be that of:
(1) The biological father and the woman intended
to be the mother if the biological father is married;
(2) The biological father only if unmarried; or
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(3) The woman intended to be the mother in cases
of a surrogate mother when an anonymous
donor’s sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.
(c) (1) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a
woman who is unmarried at the time of the birth of the child shall
be, for all legal purposes, the child of the woman giving birth,
except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which event the child
shall be that of:
(A) The biological father and the woman intended
to be the mother if the biological father is married;
(B) The biological father only if unmarried; or
(C) The woman intended to be the mother in cases
of a surrogate mother when an anonymous
donor’s sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.
(2) For birth registration purposes, in cases of surrogate
mothers the woman giving birth shall be presumed to be the
natural mother and shall be listed as such on the certificate of
birth, but a substituted certificate of birth may be issued upon
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.

